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Abstract
Developing statistical/structural models of code execution behavior is of considerable
practical importance. This thesis describes a framework for employing probabilistic
suffix models as a means of constructing behavior profiles from code-traces of Windows
XP applications. Emphasis is placed on the inference and use of probabilistic suffix trees
and automata with new contributions in the area of auxiliary symbol distributions. An
initial real-time classification system is discussed and preliminary results of detecting
known benign and viral applications are presented.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1

Motivation

Over the past decade the Internet and ultimately the number of networked computers
has grown significantly. Aided by the availability of high-speed network connections
on college campuses as well as at home and commercial sites through Internet service
providers, large amounts of information can be sent and received with low latency.
Unfortunately, malicious mobile code (MMC), for example, worms and viruses, thrive
in this virtual “playground” of potentially exploitable machines.
Malicious programs, also described as malware[14], are designed to move from one
computer to the next with intent to modify the compromised system without the consent of the operator[7]. The goals of MMC vary from attempting to compromise as
many machines as possible to making targeted attacks (e.g., denial-of-service attacks on
specific websites). MMC is an important issue to address in computer security as both
1

the infection rate and severity of the damage have increased over time[15]. It is important to note that MMC is a broad category including generic malicious applications as
well as viruses, worms, and trojans. The specific MMC discussed in this thesis pertains
only to the latter categories.
With new variants of viruses emerging so rapidly, antivirus vendors must respond
quickly to provide up-to-date protection for their customers. Symantec Corporation,
one company that provides virus protection, has definitions/signatures for nearly 68,000
viruses[2]. Given the increased connectivity and the speed and extent of viral propagation, acquiring a system to detect these emerging threats becomes critical. This thesis
discusses the framework and initial results of one such system built under the paradigm
of being able to detect known as well as unknown threats through application behavior
modeling.

1.2

Types of Detection

Systems for protecting computers from MMC are categorized into providing either misuse or anomaly detection. Misuse detection is based on knowledge of previously observed or known attacks (e.g., virus signature recognition), whereas anomaly detection
is based on knowledge of acceptable system behavior (e.g., user/application profiling).
Both types of detection have strengths and weaknesses. Misuse detection excels in
detecting known threats with a very low probability of classifying benign behavior as
malicious (i.e., minimal false positives); however, misuse detection is “reactive” in that

2

the threats must be made known to it in order for malicious activity to be detected.
Anomaly detection excels in detecting new or previously unobserved threats, or more
specifically, behavior that does not match known/trained profiles; however, it may be
the case that benign applications can exhibit behavior that does not match the detection
system’s profiles, thereby yielding a potentially higher probability of encountering false
positives. In practice, misuse detection is often chosen because of its success in detecting
threats and low false positive rates. Nonetheless, anomaly detection is of considerable
interest both in practice and in MMC classification research. This thesis focuses on the
description of one such method of employing anomaly detection through the modeling
of benign application behavior.

1.3

Related Work

The modeling of application behavior, whether benign or malicious, is not a new concept and has been investigated by many others. Although the breadth of related work
discussed here is not exhaustive, several publications are of interest. The work of Forrest et al.[5] closely resembles the approach described in this thesis. Sequences of UNIX
system calls are analyzed to build a database of normal behavior containing sequences
of observed system calls. Apap et al.[1] use Windows registry data to construct feature vectors of observed behavior. They propose that registry usage is “regular” and
that their method of anomaly detection could be used to support an existing intrusion
detection system. As a type of machine learning, hidden Markov models (HMMs), is
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used by Ourston et al.[11] as well as Yeung and Ding[18]. The Ourston et al. approach
employs HMMs for detecting network intrusions whereas Yeung and Ding’s approach
uses HMMs for building user profiles based on UNIX system call sequences. Other statistical approaches have been investigated by Schultz et al.[13] in the analysis of byte
sequences using naive Bayes classifiers. Additionally, DuMouchel and Schonlau propose applying principal component regression to sequences of user commands to detect
masquerades[3]. Finally, Giacinto et al.[6] use a pattern recognition approach to network intrusion detection based on the fusion of multiple classifiers to provide a better
trade off between generalization and false alarm rates.

1.4

Goal and Overview

The goal of this thesis is to discuss a framework for profiling Windows applications using
probabilistic suffix models and to present some initial results with regard to detecting
MMC. Chapter 2 describes two probabilistic suffix models: the probabilistic suffix tree
(PST) and probabilistic suffix automaton (PSA). Chapter 3 discusses the framework
for inferring and using the aforementioned models for profiling application behavior.
Chapter 4 presents initial classification results as a result of the described methods.
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a summary of this thesis and a discussion of future work.

4

Chapter 2

Probabilistic Suffix Models
2.1
2.1.1

Probabilistic Suffix Trees
Description

A probabilistic suffix tree (PST), as described in [12], is an n-ary tree whose nodes are
organized such that the root node gives the unconditional probability of each symbol of
the alphabet while nodes at subsequent levels give next-symbol probabilities conditioned
on a combination of one or more symbols having been already observed (i.e., a history).
The probabilities are relative frequency-count estimates of symbol occurrences in the
learning sample(s). PSTs also have a property of order corresponding to the depth of
the tree, such that a kth-order PST has k + 1 level(s). To illustrate, Fig. 2.1 shows the
third-order PST inferred from the sample “2 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 3 4” where symbols “2”
and “4” are used uniquely as the start-of-string and end-of-string delimiters. Beginning
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Figure 2.1: Example of full and pruned PST.
with the root node which represents the empty string, each node is a suffix of all its
children – hence, the model is a suffix tree. The root, representing the empty string,
is inherently a suffix of all singleton symbols. The numbers in parentheses adjacent to
the nodes are the conditional next-symbol probabilities, with the exception that the
next-symbol probability distribution for the root node has probability 0 for the unique
end symbol “4” because that symbol itself has no next-symbol in the learning sample.
One should also note that next-symbol “transitions” jump from one branch to another,
not from a parent node to one of its children, because of the suffix format of the node
labels.

2.1.2

Inference

The recursive algorithm for inferring a PST is summarized as follows. The inference
sample is scanned to determine the probability of each symbol. Then each symbol
6

with non-zero probability becomes a child node of the root, and for each such node the
sample is re-scanned to determine the next-symbol probability distribution. This may
create new leaf-nodes and add another level to the PST. The inference recursively adds
additional levels by checking each current leaf-node to determine whether new leaf-nodes
must be created as its offspring. Information about the symbols preceding the current
leaf-node is retained because these symbols may appear in labels of children thereof.
A node is added only if the substring of symbols that corresponds to the node label is
in the learning sample(s) and if a non-zero next-symbol probability distribution exists
for it. Some branches typically die out early while other branches propagate to the
maximum depth of the tree. The depth (i.e., order) can be set to a maximum allowable
value, or by default, is the length of the input sequence. Because of this property of
conditionally adding branches as needed, a PST’s variable memory length is determined
by patterns in the learning data itself.
A recursive bottom-up pruning process may now be carried out to remove leafnodes that provide the same statistical information as their parent nodes. Removing
these “same-as-parent” nodes eliminates redundancy within the tree structure, thereby
creating an attractively parsimonious model. Dashed nodes and lines in Fig. 2.1 indicate pruned nodes and associated branches. The pruning is based on the probability
information, not the frequency counts themselves.

7

2.1.3

PST Operations

The tree structure of the PST model lends itself to several types of analytical or manipulative operations. Such operations will only be mentioned briefly here, as they are
beyond the scope of this thesis. The primary role of the PST in this framework is to
stochastically represent training data in a tree structure that ultimately is transformed
into an analogous Markov chain, a process described later in Section 2.2.1.
Preliminary investigation has been performed in the area of PST merging, reconstruction, and comparison. Multiple PSTs, potentially representing varied or similar
learning samples, can be merged into a single tree that represents a PST that could
have otherwise been inferred by using all of the individual PSTs’ training sequences.
This operation allows for direct manipulation of the PSTs themselves without spending
additional computational effort to re-infer a larger PST. With regard to reconstruction,
as mentioned previously, certain nodes are pruned from the PST if they provide the same
stochastic information as their parents. An algorithm has been developed to reconstruct
the frequency counts of next-symbols for the deleted nodes, thereby reconstructing or
“flooding” nodes in the PST. This technique is useful when performing analytical operations on PSTs, such as comparing two trees. There exist several algorithm variants
for finding the distance between two given PSTs. This metric has potential value in
finding the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between PSTs. Investigative work in
this area is currently being pursued, as this technique may provide some insight into
the classification of observed application behavior.
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2.2
2.2.1

Probabilistic Suffix Automata
Description

The probabilistic suffix automaton (PSA), as described in [12], is a recurrent discreteparameter Markov chain of variable-order, and is organized such that transitions exist
between states as dictated by non-zero next-symbol probabilities in the PST. The PSA
can be thought of as the Markov chain analog of the PST, as it contains the same
next-symbol probability information as the tree. The states in the PSA are labeled in
the same manner as nodes in the PST: symbols comprising the history (i.e., providing
variable memory length) are concatenated by underscores, where the number of symbols
comprising the history is at most k, where k is the order of the PST. To illustrate,
Figure 2.2 shows an example second-order PSA containing three transient states (i.e.,
“0”, “1”, and “2”) and five recurrent states. The values on the arcs connecting two given
states represent the probability of transitioning from one state to the next. One can
also think of the arcs between states being associated with the right-most symbol of the
destination state, thus “transitioning on a single symbol.” For example, the probability
of encountering “1” after having just seen “3” is 0.5, as indicated by the probability
on the arc between states “3” and “3 1”. Transitions may only occur where arcs are
present, otherwise the probability of the given symbol is zero.

9

Figure 2.2: Example PSA.

2.2.2

Inference

Before describing the algorithm for inferring the suffix automaton, it is necessary to note
that the nodal relationship in the automaton is slightly different from the relationship
in the suffix tree. There are predecessors rather than parents and successors rather than
children. The concept of a predecessor is based on the excluding the right-most symbol.
For example, the predecessor to the state “1 3 2” is “1 3”, as opposed to the parent of
“1 3 2” being “3 2” in the suffix tree.
The suffix automaton is created entirely from the information provided in the PST
without any direct reference to the learning sample. The first step is to add all of the
leaf nodes in the suffix tree to the automaton as recurrent states. The second step is to
create a state that corresponds to the root of the suffix tree, and then “flood” downward
from that state to all of the states created in Step 1. For example, to connect the “root”
10

state with “1 3 2”, the intermediate states “1 3” and “3” are created and then connected
from the root state to “3”, “1 3”, and finally to “1 3 2”. The third step is to create
any necessary arcs between states. This is accomplished by visiting each state in the
automaton and looking at its next-symbol probability (available in the PST). If a given
symbol has a non-zero probability of occurrence after the given state label, the symbol
is appended to the end of the state label and symbols are removed from the front of the
new label until a state is found that exists in the automaton. For example, state “3 2”
in Fig. 2.2 has a non-zero probability of encountering a next symbol of “1”; therefore, a
new label is created, “3 2 1” and symbols are removed from the left side until a match
is found. Removing the “3” yields “2 1” which is a defined state, so an arc is created
between “3 2” and “2 1”. The final step is to assign state types to the states created
in Steps 2 and 3. This is done by visiting each of the created nodes and determining if
any edges incident upon them originated from recurrent states. If this is the case, the
given node is marked as recurrent. For example, state “3” is recurrent because there is
an incident arc from “2 1” which was defined as a recurrent state in Step 1. Any nodes
not marked recurrent after visiting each node are defined as transient by default.

2.2.3

Matching Techniques

Matching samples against a suffix automaton yields the cumulative probability of the
given sample being generated by the PSA. The higher the probability of match, the
more likely it is that the sample is similar to the sequence(s) used to infer the PST and
likewise, the PSA. To match a sample, the current state is set to the “root” state. The
11

sample is traversed symbol-by-symbol, appending the next symbol onto the previous
one. If the state based on the newly created label exists, the probability of transitioning
from the previous state to the current state is noted and symbols from the sample
continue to be appended. If the node does not exist, however, one symbol at a time is
removed from the front of the target state label until a node that does exist in the PSA is
encountered. Note that in the worst case the ultimate state achieved after backtracking
will be a transient state because this state should contain the next-symbol probability
to proceed with the matching algorithm. This worst-case is similar to backtracking to
the root node in the PST. For example, to match the sample “1 3 2” against the PSA
in Fig. 2.2, the following steps would occur. Step 1: node “1” exists so “3” is appended,
which occurs with probability 1/3. Step 2: node “3 2” exists and a transition occurs
with probability 1/1. The cumulative probability of match is the product of these two
probabilities: 1/3.
Using the approach stated previously, the probability of match for the entire sequence
can be found. If the sequence contains several symbols, N , the cumulative probability
of match can be very small, as fractional probabilities are continually multiplied by
other fractional probabilities. This issue is addressed by [8] by employing a “sliding
window” approach in which the probability of m symbols is calculated, where m  N .
This technique allows a series of probabilities to be computed as the match sample is
traversed. The framework presented in this thesis employs this matching technique to
ultimately achieve application behavior classification.
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2.2.4

PSA Operations

As with the PST, the PSA model lends itself to several types of analytical or manipulative operations. Again, such operations will only be mentioned briefly here, as they
are beyond the scope of this thesis. The primary role of the PSA in this framework is
to serve as a model of known behavior so that probabilities of given match sequences
can be computed to determine how closely the sequences represent the inference data.
Because the PSA is a Markov chain, any mathematical operations that can be used
with Markov models apply[9]. Some example Markovian statistics of interest include
steady-state distributions and the mean number of transitions between states. The
steady-state distributions may be used to determine how frequently a given PSA state
is visited in the long run. The mean number of transitions can be used to determine
if transitions between two given states are occurring at predictable rates. For example,
if a sample causes the PSA to transition from state i to state j in a consistently low
number of transitions, and the mean transition value mij is quite large, this scenario may
indicate that the observed sample is getting from state i to state j through some shorter
route than the expected one. Additionally, investigative work is being pursued in the
area of comparing two PSAs, similar to the operation of comparing two PSTs, as this
technique may also provide some insight into the classification of observed application
behavior.

13

Chapter 3

Modeling Application Behavior
3.1

Detection System Context

The application behavior framework presented in this thesis will ultimately be integrated
into a Windows-based system developed by collaboration with the Florida Institute of
Technology (FIT). Their system called HEAT (Hostile Environment Application Testing) as originally proposed by [16] intercepts low-level system calls made to the operating
system, e.g., when a program reads or writes a file, accesses or modifies the registry,
dynamically loads runtime libraries, and so forth. HEAT serves as the underpinning for
another application layer called Gatekeeper (GK)[4]. See Fig. 3.1. Gatekeeper monitors
the information pertaining to the intercepted function calls to determine if the monitored application is exhibiting benign or malicious behavior. Gatekeeper currently uses
a genetic algorithm-tuned scoring system to assign threat levels to predefined behaviors.
If too many malicious behaviors of a certain nature occur within a certain period, the
14

GATEKEEPER
Meta−matching Engine
Windows Application

API Call Stream

M1

M2

Mk

Classification System

Figure 3.1: Conceptual view of Gatekeeper.
offending application is terminated in an attempt to prevent any further unwarranted actions. Future developments of Gatekeeper include the use of multiple detection engines,
including the original score-based approach, the probabilistic suffix model approach described in this thesis, and perhaps other methods to create a “meta-matching engine”
that will ultimately decide whether to allow or block application system calls.
The classification framework based on the aforementioned probabilistic suffix models
provides an additional classification approach to augment the existing detection capabilities of Gatekeeper. The two approaches differ in that Gatekeeper’s current detection
technique is based primarily on predefined malicious behaviors. One should note that
the system is tuned for detecting malicious behavior rather than specific malicious signatures, as most virus scanners typically do. The detection technique presented in this
thesis is entirely data-driven and assumes no pre-existing knowledge of specific benign
or malicious behavior. The goal is to infer a model (or possibly models) of fundamental
benign application behavior such that other benign applications exhibit behavior simi-
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Table 3.1: Excerpt of log trace information.
PID
2760
Timestamp 19:24:06:510
Function
LoadLibrary
Parameter
C:\WINNT\ System32\ADVAPI32.DLL
lar to that of the applications used for model inference, whereas malicious applications
exhibit anomalous behavior.

3.2

Model Inference

Gatekeeper currently has the ability to function as a “benign tracer,” allowing applications to be monitored for the sole purpose of recording what system call activity takes
place during the application’s execution. The information made available by Gatekeeper
consists of text-based logs consisting of one line for each intercepted system call. Table 3.1 presents some of the information for one such log entry associated with loading
a dynamically-linked library.
The current implementation of the PST and PSA inference tools rely on integer-encoded
symbols as input. Therefore, the first step in modeling application behavior is to map
the appropriate string-based log information into integers. As a first approach used in
this initial framework, the intercepted function calls are grouped into three categories –
file, registry, and library – as the majority of function calls that applications use during
their execution fall into these groups. Table 3.2 gives the specific mapping used for
model inference.

16

Table 3.2: Integer mapping definition.
1, 2 Sequence-start and Sequence-end
3
File Operations
4
Registry Operations
5
Library Operations
Once the log files designated for training have been converted into integer sequences,
they are concatenated together to form one long training sequence. Note that concatenation does not affect the PST inference accuracy because special separators used in
the concatenation process indicate that the symbol frequency counts should not overlap
from the end of one sequence to the beginning of the next. After the PST has been
inferred, it is in turn used to infer a corresponding PSA. Finally, the PSA is used as a
model of learned behavior so that other application traces (as integer sequences) can be
matched against it to compute probabilities of match.

3.3
3.3.1

Auxiliary Symbol Distributions
Description

Although the initial symbol (i.e., alphabet) choice seems to cover the broad set of
operation types that applications employ, it is important to note the domain being
modeled. Given the implementation and protocols of system call usage defined by the
Windows operating system, certain patterns of system call sequences become evident in
both benign and malicious applications. For example, for a file to be modified, it must
be opened, written to, and finally closed. This open-use-close pattern also occurs with
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respect to registry use. Because this behavior is common to both benign and malicious
applications, using the auxiliary information provided for each function call (e.g., its
parameters) can allow more specific information to be integrated into the model. For
example, this auxiliary information indicates specific libraries that are loaded, registry
keys that are used, directories that are managed, and so forth. Such information would
be stored for every node in the PSA so that every symbol context has a corresponding
auxiliary context as well. In other words, given a symbolic context (i.e., state in the
PSA), the probability of encountering a given piece of auxiliary data (e.g., registry key,
library filename, etc.) can be determined. The probability distributions can vary for
each node because different information (e.g., registry keys used, files opened, etc.) may
be different for each context as it is observed in the training data.
The additional information is deemed as auxiliary because it refines the alphabet
without changing the underlying probability model. One can think of this auxiliary
information as an added layer of conditional probability – for example, the probability of
loading a specific library given that a certain context of file, registry, or library operations
has occurred. An equivalent symbol mapping can be achieved by designating symbols
to account for the context. For example, if symbol “3” corresponds to file operations,
symbol “30” could indicate file operations in the user’s area, “31” could indicate file
operations in the system directory, “32” could indicate file operations in a temporary
directory, and so on. The drawback to creating additional alphabet symbols is that
the degree of the PST increases, thereby increasing the number of branches/children a
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given node can have. This in turn increases the computational cost of inferring as well
as using larger, more complex models. By using a small but coarse primary alphabet
(i.e., broad categories), the auxiliary information can accompany the smaller models
without unnecessarily inflating the model size.
With regard to file and registry key auxiliary data, an additional layer of conditional
probability is imposed. Either based on the function name or its parameters, a given file
or registry function can execute in one of the following contexts: access, modification,
deletion, or creation. In other words, the auxiliary information ultimately provides
the probability of a specific piece of data (e.g., registry key) working within a specific
execution context (e.g., deletion) given that a certain sequences of symbols has occurred.
This added layer of conditional probability exploits a feature of the problem domain in
that benign applications work with specific auxiliary data in a certain context, whereas
malicious applications are more likely to work in another context. For example, a benign
application such as a text editor would not be expected to delete all of the files in the
system directory whereas a malicious application may.

3.3.2

Inference

The algorithm for inferring the auxiliary symbol distributions (ASDs) is summarized as
follows. For each state in the PSA, the integer-based training sequences are traversed to
find all occurrences of the symbols corresponding to the state’s label. These locations
are used to find the corresponding function call data in the original logs so that the
parameter information can be extracted. A simple count is kept for the number of
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occurrences of the given parameter. If the parameter is encountered again in another
training sequence (for the same state), the count is incremented, thereby creating a
distribution of frequency counts of occurrences for auxiliary data items observed for
the context designated by the state label. File and registry operations are partitioned
into the four previously mentioned execution contexts, thereby creating four unique
distributions for the given state (e.g., items accessed, modified, deleted, and created).
The final ASD model consists of a distribution (or distributions in the case of file and
registry operations) for each node in the PSA.

3.3.3

Matching

The ASD model corresponds directly to the PSA as there are distributions for each state.
As the probability of match is computed as defined in Section 2.2.3, the probability
of encountering a given auxiliary data item is computed for the current state. The
probability of auxiliary data is simply the ratio of the number of times the given item
has been observed to occur to the number of total occurrences of all auxiliary items for
the current state. For example, if a given library has been observed to occur in 100
out of 150 times, the probability assigned is 0.667; however, if a given library has never
been observed in the ASD inference process for the current state, a probability of zero
is assigned.
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3.4

Classification Approach

Once the models of benign applications (i.e., PSA and ASD) are in place, test sequences
representing both benign and malicious applications can be matched against them to
determine the probability of match. As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, a sliding window
technique is used rather than calculating the cumulative probability of match. In this
initial framework, a sliding window size of one symbol is used, thus giving n − 1 probability values for a sequence of length n. Given the close coupling of the PSA and ASD
models, the product of the match probabilities computed from each of the models is the
probability value used in classification, rather than treating the two probabilities separately. Initial experiments showed that the match probabilities exhibit high variability
throughout the sequence, indicating that some type of smoothing computation would
be necessary to capture the overall probability trend. For this particular framework, an
exponentially-weighted moving average (EWMA) was used so that the amount of emphasis placed on recent or past events could be varied. Formally, the EWMA is defined
as
yi = λxi + (1 − λ)yi−1

where xi is the ith probability of match, yi is the ith exponentially weighted probability
of match, and λ is the EWMA parameter such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1[10]. If more emphasis is
to be placed on immediate or more recent events, larger λ values are used.
Sequence classification is performed based on an empirically-derived threshold. The
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initial experiments and techniques presented in this thesis are based on the data being
partitioned into four groups: benign training, benign testing, viral training, and viral
testing. Each of the sequences in the viral training category are used to determine
the threshold. First, the exponentially-weighted probabilities for each viral training sequence are computed. Second, the mean EWMA value for each sequence is calculated.
Lastly, the maximum EWMA mean is used as the threshold τ . This technique guarantees that the models will, at worst, identify all viral training samples as malicious.
Classification of an arbitrary sequence is performed by observing if yi > τ , where yi
is the exponentially-weighted probability. If the threshold is exceeded, the sequence is
labeled as malicious; otherwise, the sequence is labeled as benign. Formally, if a benign
sequence is misclassified, a false positive occurred (e.g., a benign application labeled as
malicious); likewise, if a malicious sequence is misclassified, a false negative occurred
(e.g., a malicious application labeled as benign). The performance of the techniques
used in the initial framework presented here are based on the false positive rate and
the true negative rate, or in other words the number of benign applications erroneously
stopped and the number of malicious applications correctly stopped.
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Chapter 4

Experiments and Results
4.1
4.1.1

Datasets
Benign and Malicious Samples

In this initial experiment, two classes of applications are monitored – benign and malicious (i.e., viral). The benign application set consists of ten runs each of five commonlyused Microsoft applications: Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, and Internet Explorer.
Each of these runs was created by performing typical yet unique tasks that would be
carried out in various computing environments, such as personal, academic, and commercial. Applications from the same vendor (i.e., Microsoft) were chosen so that application variability would be minimized via the use of similar implementation schemes,
commonly-used libraries, and so forth. See Appendices A and B for descriptions of the
benign training and testing sequences respectively. The malicious application set con-
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sists of 223 Windows viruses that were known to be “in the wild” for specific months,
ranging from December 2002 to March 2004[17]. This set of viruses contains several wellknown threats as well as some variants for specific viruses. See Appendices C and D for
listings of the viruses in the training and testing sets respectively.

4.1.2

Training and Testing Samples

The benign and malicious application traces are both partitioned into training and
testing groups. The benign set is divided such that there are five runs for each of the
five applications in each set, yielding 25 training traces and 25 testing traces. The
malicious set is grouped in the same manner as the co-researchers at FIT, where 73
viruses from the December 2002 wild-list are designated as training and the remaining
150 viruses from the January 2003 to March 2004 wild-lists are used for testing[4]. The
motivation behind this partitioning is to provide training samples from an older group of
viruses to determine how well the detection system is able to detect progressively newer
threats. The same approach is adopted here so that future comparisons of detection
effectiveness can be made.

4.1.3

Model Descriptions

Each of the 25 training samples are re-mapped into integer symbols and are concatenated
to form a single inference sample as discussed previously in Chapter 3. This sequence
is used to infer a PST and PSA, thus creating a model of benign behavior for the five
monitored applications. Specifically, the inference sequence contains 203,820 symbols,
24
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Figure 4.1: Excerpt of the probability of match for a run of Internet Explorer.
which is then used to infer a second-order PST containing 15 nodes. The PST is then
used to infer a second-order PSA containing 16 states. Although not discussed here,
previous experiments using application traces from a earlier version of Gatekeeper have
shown that model order does affect the classification abilities; however, for the conditions
of the framework presented here, preliminary trials showed that desirable classification
results could be achieved without a large history (i.e., high model order), but using
some history proves to be effective (e.g., still employing a variable-memory model).

4.2

Model Usage

Once the PSA is in place, each of the individual traces from the benign and malicious
testing sets are matched against the PSA. For example, an excerpt of the probability of
match values for a benign testing sequence for Microsoft Internet Explorer is shown in
Fig. 4.1 and a similar excerpt of the W32@Yaha.U virus is shown in Fig. 4.2.
Next, each of these match probability sequences are smoothed using an exponentiallyweighted moving average with a parameter of λ = 0.001, thereby giving more emphasis
on past events and less on recent events. The mean EWMA probability is calculated
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Figure 4.2: Excerpt of the probability of match for the W32@Yaha.U virus.
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Figure 4.3: Excerpt of the EWMA probability for a run of Internet Explorer.
for each of the 73 malicious training samples to ultimately find the highest EWMA
mean that will be used for classification. For the data in this experiment the threshold is calculated to be τ = 0.02. Figs. 4.3 and 4.4 show the exponentially-weighted
probabilities.
For these particular samples, Internet Explorer does not fall below the threshold and is
therefore classified as benign; however, W32@Yaha.U fails to exceed the threshold and
is therefore classified as malicious.

4.3

Classification Results

Each of the sequences designated for testing are matched, smoothed, and classified in
the same manner. Each of the 25 benign testing sequences have EWMA probabilities
that continually remain above τ and are correctly classified as benign. Likewise, each of
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Figure 4.4: Excerpt of the EWMA probability for the W32@Yaha.U virus.
the 150 viral testing sequences have EWMA probabilities that are always below τ and
are correctly classified as malicious. Overall, this initial detection framework provides
optimal classification: a false positive rate of 0% and a true negative rate of 100%.
It is important to note that these ideal classification results, although very promising,
may only apply to the specific data and modeling techniques used in this experiment.
In practice, a general solution is needed that is able to account for more varied types of
training and testing data without significantly raising the false positive rate or lowering
the true negative rate. If such results were to occur, the end-user would likely not use the
detection system because of benign applications being erroneously terminated, or would
not be adequately protected from potential threats, respectively. It therefore becomes
necessary to find a balanced system that can distinguish unobserved benign behavior
from true malicious behavior without disrupting the end-user’s computing experience.
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Chapter 5

Summary and Future Work
This thesis presented an initial framework for profiling Windows applications using
probabilistic suffix models. These models are trained using benign application traces
so that applications exhibiting unobserved behavior can be deemed anomalous. Initial
classification results show that using multiple runs of a small set of applications (to
provide statistical reinforcement) can provide accurate classification of both benign and
malicious sequences.
As mentioned previously, misclassifications may occur as the set of training and
testing applications becomes broader (i.e., more than five Windows applications, or
additional samples even within those five). Further refinement of data encoding with
regard to function-to-integer mapping as well as auxiliary distribution handling can be
used to possibly lead to a more general stochastic model of typical benign behavior while
still providing acceptable classification results. As this occurs, the amount of training
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and testing data will need to increase to determine the capabilities of the system. The
initial results presented in this thesis are based on a relatively small training and testing
sets, and more sequences will be required to ensure consistent performance. In addition
to the probabilistic suffix model operations currently being investigated (as mentioned
in Chapter 2), several statistical approaches pertaining to using match probabilities
are being studied. Other types of data modeling tools and classification techniques are
also being pursued. Lastly, a more generalized version of the detection system presented
here will be integrated into the Gatekeeper software package assist in providing real-time
threat detection.
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Appendix A
Benign Training Sample Descriptions
Excel DataentrySave – Entered data into rows and columns, then saved to My Documents.
Excel LaunchExit – Launched Excel, then exited.
Excel LoadChartSave – Loaded existing worksheet and made a chart from the data.
Saved the worksheet with the chart (under the same filename).
Excel LoadPrint – Loaded existing worksheet and printed it to the default printer.
Excel LoadWorksheetSave – Loaded saved worksheet, modified some cell data, then
saved the worksheet (under the same filename).
IE Amazonnav – Logged into amazon.com and looked for previous invoices (uses cookies).
IE GooglesearchNav – Used google.com for two searches and followed top-most link for
each search.
IE LaunchExit – Launched Internet Explorer, then exited.
IE NavJavascript – Loaded a page with a Javascript countdown timer.
IE SymantecnavPrint – Searched symantec.com for information on a recent virus, then
printed the page to the default printer.
Outlook Calendarmanip – Viewed the calendar and added an entry/appointment.
Outlook Emaildraft – Started a reply to an email in the Inbox and saved it as a draft.
Outlook LaunchExit – Launched Outlook, then exited.
Outlook Printcalendar – Viewed the calendar and printed the weekly-view to the
default printer.
Outlook Taskmanip – Viewed the task list, added two items. “Checked off” one item,
then deleted it.
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PPT LaunchExit – Launched PowerPoint, then exited.
PPT LoadPrint – Loaded existing presentation and printed “handouts” to the default
printer.
PPT LoadShow – Loaded existing presentation, then performed the “slide show.”
PPT LoadTransSave – Loaded existing presentation, added transitions between each
slide, and saved presentation (under the same filename).
PPT MakepresntSave – Made a five-slide presentation, then saved to My Documents.
Word FormattextSave – Entered some text and formatted it in various ways. Saved
document to My Documents.
Word LaunchExit – Launched Word, then exited.
Word LoadPrint – Loaded existing document and printed it to the default printer.
Word LoadWordartSave – Loaded existing document, added WordArt, then saved document (under the same filename).
Word TableSave – Added a table to an empty document, entered data, then saved
document to My Documents.
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Appendix B
Benign Testing Sample Descriptions
Excel Chartformat – Loaded existing worksheet. Plotted data. Formatted the axes,
plot background fill pattern, and line color. Saved to My Documents.
Excel DataentryCellnames – Entered three columns of data and “named the columns
(cell range names). Saved to My Documents.
Excel Datavalidation – Loaded existing worksheet, added a data validation rule for
a fourth column. (Makes a pull-down list of valid entries, and shows customizable error
if user enters invalid data.) Saved to My Documents.
Excel Formulas – Loaded existing worksheet. Inserted some formulas. Activated the
Formula Auditing toolbar, then used a tool to show dependencies between cells with
formulas. Added a watch to a cell to see how its contents are computed. Saved to My
Documents.
Excel Subtotals – Loaded existing worksheet, then used the “subtotals feature to
calculate running totals for columns/rows. Saved to My Documents.
IE DownloadPics – Navigated to digitalblasphemy.com and downloaded two background
images to My Documents.
IE DownloadZip – Downloaded a Winzip file from my website (IE displayed dialog box
prompting for action).
IE Flash – Navigated to a Flash-enabled site (uses browser plugin to handle Flash files).
IE Homepage – Navigated to UTKCS department website and set it as the homepage.
IE Newssites – Navigated to cnn.com, foxnews.com, and reuters.com and clicked on
the top headline for each website.
Outlook Archive – Archived Outlook data to My Documents subdirectory.
Outlook Contacts – Added contact to the address book, then searched for that contact.
Outlook Customize – Customized appearance of Outlook startup (colors, fonts, etc.).
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Outlook Notes – Edited existing “note” and added a new one.
Outlook Recurtasks – Set up three recurring tasks with various properties (importance,
percent done, status, etc.).
PPT ChartDiagram – Loaded existing presentation. Inserted chart and diagram on two
new slides. Saved to My Documents.
PPT PicsRearrange – Loaded existing presentation. Inserted two pictures (JPGs), then
rearranged some slides. Saved to My Documents.
PPT Saveasweb – Loaded existing presentation. Saved as web page.
PPT SlideMaster – Loaded existing presentation. Altered slide master to have a different font. Saved to My Documents.
PPT SlidenotesPrint – Loaded existing presentation. Added presentation notes for
each slide, then printed slides (presentation notes format). Saved to My Documents.
Word Inserts – Loaded existing document. Inserted a “diagram and edited its text.
Inserted hyperlink. Saved to My Documents.
Word Pagesetup – Loaded existing document. Changed page orientation (landscape),
margins, and added page border. Reformatted the diagram to fit within the page, then
did a print-preview. Saved to My Documents.
Word Textformat – Loaded existing document. Changed font color, size, name, and
spacing. Enabled automatic page numbering. Saved to My Documents.
Word Mailinglabels – Created mailing labels, then printed them. No save performed.
Word Textentry – Typed some text. Misspelled some words intentionally (to use automatic spell-check feature). Made a numbered list with AutoFormat. Spell-checked
document. Saved to My Documents.
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Appendix C
Viral Training Sample Listing
Viruses listed by the names assigned by Symantec Corporation[2].
Happy99.Worm
PrettyPark.Worm
W32.Aliz.Worm
W32.Anset.B.Worm
W32.Anset.C.Worm
W32.Anset.Worm
W32.Aplore@mm
W32.Apost.Worm@mm
W32.Badtrans.B@mm
W32.Badtrans.get@mm
W32.Benjamin.Worm
W32.Blebla.B.Worm
W32.Brid.A@mm
W32.Bugbear@mm
W32.Cervivec.A@mm
W32.Chir@mm
W32.Choke.Worm
W32.Datom.Worm
W32.ElKern.3326
W32.ElKern.3587
W32.ElKern.4926
W32.ExploreZip.L.Worm
W32.FBound.gen@mm
W32.Frethem.A@mm
W32.Frethem.L@mm
W32.Gibe.A@mm
W32.Gokar.A@mm
W32.Goner.A@mm
W32.HLLW.Acebo
W32.HLLW.Bymer
W32.HLLW.GOP@mm
W32.HLLW.Hai
W32.HLLW.Oror.B@mm
W32.HLLW.Qaz.A
W32.HLLW.Winevar
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W32.Higuy@mm
W32.Hybris.A
W32.Hybris.B
W32.Hybris.C
W32.Hybris.D
W32.Klez.A@mm
W32.Klez.B@mm
W32.Klez.C@mm
W32.Klez.D@mm
W32.Klez.E@mm
W32.Klez.G@mm
W32.Klez.H@mm
W32.Kriz
W32.Maldal.C@mm
W32.Maldal.E@mm
W32.Maldal.F@mm
W32.Mylife.A@mm
W32.Mylife.B@mm
W32.Mylife.F@mm
W32.Mylife.G@mm
W32.Mylife.J@mm
W32.Myparty@mm
W32.Naked@mm
W32.Navidad.16896
W32.Navidad
W32.Nimda.A@mm
W32.Pinfi
W32.Prolin.Worm
W32.Sircam.Worm@mm
W32.Supova.Worm
W32.Yaha.C@mm
W32.Yaha.D@mm
W32.Yaha.E@mm
W32.Yaha.G@mm
W32.Yaha@mm
W32.Zoek.E@mm
W95.MTX
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Appendix D
Viral Testing Sample Listing
Viruses listed by the names assigned by Symantec Corporation[2].
January 2003 WildList
W32.ExploreZip.L.Worm
W32.Frethem.K@mm
W32.Galil@mm
W32.HLLP.Handy
W32.HLLW.Lioten
W32.Opaserv.G.Worm
W32.Opaserv.K.Worm
W32.Opaserv.Worm
W32.Supova.E.Worm W32.Yaha.J@mm
W32.Yaha.K@mm
February 2003 WildList
W32.Supova.D.Worm
W32.Yaha.L@mm
March 2003 WildList
W32.Gibe.B@mm
W32.HLLW.Lovegate.C@mm
W32.HLLW.Oror@mm
April 2003 WildList
W32.Bibrog.C@mm
W32.Ganda.A@mm
W32.Hawawi.D.Worm
W32.HLLW.Lovgate.F@mm
W32.HLLW.Lovgate.G@mm
W32.HLLW.Nebiwo.Q
W32.HLLW.Nebiwo.R
W32.Nicehello@mm
W32.Yaha.P@mm
W32.Yaha.Q@mm
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May 2003 WildList
W32.HLLW.Deloder
W32.HLLW.Fizzer@mm
W32.HLLW.Lovegate.B@mm
W32.Navidad.16896
W32.Opaserv.G.Worm
June 2003 WildList
W32.Alhem.A@mm
W32.Beast.41472
W32.Bugbear.A@mm
W32.Bugbear.B@mm
W32.Femot.Worm
W32.HLLW.Fizzer@mm
W32.HLLW.Lovgate.I@mm
W32.HLLW.Lovgate.J@mm
W32.HLLW.Lovgate.K@mm
W32.HLLW.Lovgate.L@mm
W32.HLLW.Magold@mm
W32.HLLW.Redist@mm
W32.Hawawi.D.Worm
W32.Kitro.C.Worm
W32.Nolor@mm
W32.Opaserv.J.Worm
W32.Sobig.C@mm
W32.Sobig.D@mm
W32.Yaha.U@mm
July 2003 WildList
W32.HLLW.Magold@mm
W32.HLLW.Purol
W32.HLLW.Winur
W32.Jeefo
W32.Mapson.Worm
W32.Mylife.M@mm
W32.Sobig.E@mm
W32.Yaha.T@mm
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September 2003 WildList
W32.Blaster.B.Worm
W32.Blaster.C.Worm
W32.Blaster.E.Worm
W32.Blaster.Worm
W32.HLLW.Warpigs.B
W32.Israz@mm
W32.Mimail.A@mm
W32.Opaserv.P.Worm
W32.Randex.D
W32.Sobig.F@mm
W32.Swen.A@mm
W32.Viveal@mm
W32.Welchia.Worm
October 2003 WildList
W32.Dumaru.C@mm
W32.Dumaru.H@mm
W32.HLLW.Torvel@mm
W32.Inmota.Worm
W32.Mimail.C@mm
W32.Mimail.G@mm
W32.Randex.E
W32.Sober@mm
November 2003 WildList
W32.Mimail.E@mm
W32.Mimail.F@mm
W32.Mimail.G@mm
W32.Mimail.I@mm
W32.Mimail.J@mm
December 2003 WildList
W32.Mimail.M@mm
W32.Sober@mm
W32.Sober.C@mm
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January 2004 WildList
W32.Cissi.A@mm
W32.Darker.Worm
W32.Dumaru.Y@mm
W32.HLLW.Darby
W32.Jitux.Worm
W32.Mimail.L@mm
W32.Mimail.P@mm
W32.Mimail.Q@mm
W32.Mimail.S@mm
W32.Mydoom.A@mm
W32.Mydoom.B@mm
W32.Scold@mm
W32.Sober.B@mm
February 2004 WildList
W32.HLLW.Lovgate@mm
W32.HLLW.Lovgate.E@mm
March 2004 WildList
W32.Beagle.C@mm
W32.Beagle.D@mm
W32.Beagle.E@mm
W32.Beagle.F@mm
W32.Beagle.G@mm
W32.Beagle.H@mm
W32.Beagle.I@mm
W32.Beagle.J@mm
W32.Beagle.K@mm
W32.Beagle.N@mm
W32.Beagle.P@mm
W32.Beagle.Q@mm
W32.Beagle.R@mm
W32.Beagle.S@mm
W32.Beagle.T@mm
W32.Beagle.U@mm
W32.Blackmal@mm
W32.HLLW.Capsid
W32.HLLW.Doomjuice.B
W32.HLLW.Lovgate.Q@mm
W32.HLLW.Lovgate.U@mm
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W32.HLLW.Raleka
W32.Mydoom.F@mm
W32.Mydoom.G@mm
W32.Mydoom.H@mm
W32.Netsky.B@mm
W32.Netsky.C@mm
W32.Netsky.D@mm
W32.Netsky.E@mm
W32.Netsky.F@mm
W32.Netsky.H@mm
W32.Netsky.J@mm
W32.Netsky.K@mm
W32.Netsky.L@mm
W32.Netsky.M@mm
W32.Netsky.N@mm
W32.Netsky.O@mm
W32.Netsky.P@mm
W32.Netsky.Q@mm
W32.Netsky.T@mm
W32.Sober.D@mm
W32.Welchia.B.Worm
W32.Welchia.C.Worm
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